econim

David Warsh: The mid-terms, ‘national conservatism’, U.K. confusion, Anglo-Saxon invasion

Ohio Democratic Congressman and U.S. Senate candidate Tim Ryan

SOMERVILLE, Mass.

The way I see it, the United States and its NATO allies goaded Vladimir Putin into a war that Russia cannot hope to win and which Putin is determined not to lose.  What will happen next? The U.S. mid-term congressional elections, that’s what.

Interesting election campaigns are unfolding all across the nation. I take everything that Republican Party strategist Karl Rove says with a grain of salt, but suspect he is correct when he predicts the GOP will pick up around 20 seats in the House in November, enough to give Trumpist Republicans a slender majority there for the next two years.  The Democrats likely will control the Senate, setting the stage for the 2024 presidential election.

To my mind, the most interesting contest in the country is the Senate election involving 10--term Congressman Tim Ryan and Hillbilly Elegy author J. D. Vance, a lawyer and venture capitalist. That’s because, if Ryan soundly defeats Vance, he’s got a good shot at becoming the Democratic presidential nominee in 2024.  Ryan and Vance have agreed to two debates, Oct. 10 and 17.

By ow, it goes practically without saying that President Joe Biden will not run for re-election on the eve of turning 82.  Ryan, who will be 51 in 2024, challenged House Speaker’s Nancy Pelosi’s leadership of the Democratic Party party in 2016, and sought the party’s presidential nomination in 2020.

A demonstrated command of the battleground states of the Old Northwest – Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin – would make Ryan a strong contender against Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, the likely Republican nominee.

It was a turbulent week. Having proclaimed Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian regions, Putin delivered what Robyn Dixon, Moscow bureau of The Washington Post, described as “likely the most consequential” of his 23 years in office. But rather than a clarion call to restore Russian greatness as he clearly intended,” she wrote, “the address seemed the bluster and filibuster of a leader struggling to recover his grip — on his war, and his country.”

A starling miscalculation by Britain’s new Conservative Party government threatened to destabilize global financial markets.  And the costs of gradual global warming continue to make themselves clear.

In the midst of all this, an old friend called my attention to two essays that seemed to take antithetical views of the prospects.  The first, “How Europe Became So Rich’’, by the distinguished economic historian Joel Mokyr,

Many scholars now believe, however, that in the long run the benefits of competing states might have been larger than the costs. In particular, the existence of multiple competing states encouraged scientific and technological innovation…. [T]he ‘states system’ constrained the ability of political and religious authorities to control intellectual innovation. If conservative rulers clamped down on heretical and subversive (that is, original and creative) thought, their smartest citizens would just go elsewhere (as many of them, indeed, did).

Mokyr concluded, “Far from all the low-hanging technological fruits having been picked, the best is still to come.”

The second, “Seven Years of Trump Has the GOP taking the Long View’’, by long-time newspaper columnist Thomas Edsall, cites the success of Viktor Orban in governing Hungry, and then examines various signs of the vulnerability of the liberal state in America. These include  the durability of the Trump base, and  an incipient “National Conservatism” project, created in 2019 by the Edmund Burke Foundation,  since joined by an array of scholars and writers associated with such institutions, magazines and think tanks as the Claremont Institute, Hillsdale College, the Hoover Institution, the Federalist, the journal First Things, the Manhattan Institute, the Ethics and Public Policy Center and National Review.

What characterizes national conservatism?  Commitments to the infusion of religion and traditional family values into the government sphere, Edsall says, and, perhaps especially, opposition to “woke progressivism,” Conservative Conference chairman Christopher DeMuth puts it this way: Progressives promote instability and seek “to turn the world upside down:”

[M]ayhem and misery at an open national border. Riot and murder in lawless city neighborhoods. Political indoctrination of schoolchildren. Government by executive ukase. Shortages throughout the world’s richest economy. Suppression of religion and private association. Regulation of everyday language — complete with contrived redefinitions of familiar words and ritual recantations for offenders.

All I could do in reply was to take comfort in evidence that borders have been open to chaotic traffic for a very long time, across  barriers more intimidating than the Rio Grande River, resulting in successful assimilation.  Science magazine (subscription required) reported last month that new archaeological evidence tends to support the traditional view of “How the Anglo-Saxons Settled England”.

An 8th Century (C.E.) history written by a monk named Bede asserted that Rome’s decline in about 400 C.E. opened the way to an invasion from the east. Tribes from what is today northwestern Germany and southern Denmark “came over into the island, and [the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes] began to increase so much, that they became terrible to the natives.”

For a time, archaeologists doubted Bede’s account, preferring to think that only a relatively small bands of warrior elites could have successfully imposed their culture on the existing population. “Roman Britain looks very different from the Anglo-Saxon period 200 years later,” one archaeologist acknowledged to Science. But DNA samples from the graves of 494 people who died in England between 400 and 900 show they derived more than three-quarters of their ancestry from northern Europe.

The results address a long-standing debate about whether past cultural change signals new people moving in or a largely unchanged population adopting new technologies or beliefs. With the Anglo-Saxons, the data point strongly to migration, says University of Cambridge archaeologist Catherine Hills, who was not part of the research. The new data suggest “significant movement into the British Isles … taking us back to a fairly traditional picture of what’s going on.”

That doesn’t mean that the migration was especially turbulent, as when the Vikings began raiding a few centuries later, leaving relatively few genetic traces behind. Language changed relatively quickly after the Anglo-Saxons began arriving, a sign that people were talking, not fighting. Integration and intermarriage persisted for centuries. Indeed, archaeologists discovered “one high status woman in her 20s with mixed ancestry was laid to rest near modern Cambridge under a prominent mound with silvered jewelry, amber beads, and a whole cow.” That suggests more complexity than simple conquest, one archaeologist told Science.

Same as it ever was, in other words – all but the cow.

David Warsh, a veteran columnist and an economic historian, is proprietor of Somerville-based economicprincipals. com

 

David Warsh: Looking back at a big U.S. mistake and a great success

A protester on Wall Street in the wake of the AIG bonus payments controversy is interviewed by news media during 2008-2000 financial crisis.

SOMERVILLE, Mass.
If you strip away all that we have learned since, in order to look back at the election of 2016, the remarkable thing is that Donald Trump didn’t defeat Hillary Clinton by a wide margin then {and lost the popular vote by 3 million votes} and win re-election in a landslide. He was against America’s war in Iraq; soft on Russia; tough on China; phobic on immigration, especially from Mexico. He deplored blue-collar criminals, talked up investment in infrastructure, and sought tax cuts for corporations and the well-to-do. In a nation eager for change, Trump was a television populist running against a Yale Law School elitist who possessed an indelible record in government going back twenty-five years. Only climate change was missing from his platform.

The election was close mainly because a large number of swing voters, just short of preponderance, understood that Trump was a shady character who played well on fears.  We know now that he is rotten to the core, at least most of us do, Republicans as well as Democrats. Yet the issues that Trump brought to the 2016 election remain at center of the of the 2024 campaign. While President Biden adopted as many of Trump’s positions as he dared, and modified others as much as he could, Trump’s all-but-forgotten core political agenda dominates debate today.

But never mind Trump, and his cunning political instincts. A better way to think about America’s future is to reflect on how the three decades unwound since the end of the Cold War, and ask, in the simplest possible terms, how events could have been otherwise. Arguments range the length of the policy spectrum – abortion, inflation, inequality, health care, mass incarceration, gun control, civil violence – the list is long. My aim here is to identify two overarching American policies with global reach that brought us to the present day. One has been a spectacular failure; the other, a brilliant, if inconspicuous, success.

The failure has been NATO enlargement, which Russian President Vladimir Putin asserts that the U.S. disavowed in 1990 in return for the acquiescence of the former Soviet Union to the reunification of Germany within NATO. Expansion was barely noticed when President Bill Clinton’s administration sought, in 1992, to admit Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to the alliance. After Clinton added Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to the list of prospective members in 1997, Russia began to take umbrage – all the more so after Vladimir Putin took over in 2000.

George W. Bush paid little attention to Putin’s objections, and in 2008 put Ukraine and Georgia on the path to membership. Putin expressed strong opposition, starting and winning a small war, in Georgia. After Hillary Clinton and John Kerry kept up the NATO pressure as secretaries of state under President Obama, Putin annexed the Crimean Peninsula and began battling for portions of eastern Ukraine.

By the time that Trump began pandering to Putin, it was too late to change course.   Secretary of State Antony Blinken last November signed a “strategic partnership charter” with Ukraine; the next day, Putin commenced planning an inept invasion of his sovereign neighbor. Finland and Sweden have signed on to the alliance in protest, but six months into a proxy war with Russia, NATO, if not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, has lost sympathy in much of the rest of the world. Meanwhile, China’s plans to absorb Taiwan lie just over the horizon. Joe Biden has said the U.S. intends to prevent it. America’s deeply unpalatable alternative to war there is the same as it was in Ukraine. Let the weak negotiate with the strong, and do what it can to prepare itself for Cold War II.

And the most successful U.S. policy since 1990?  That would be the management of the global monetary system by the Federal Reserve System, in concert with the central banks and treasuries of other leading nations, including China and Russia.   I am not thinking of the “Great Moderation” of the Nineties and the run-up in the Oughts to the crisis that began in 2007. I doubt that sequence is as yet very well understood.  But there should be no doubt about what happened in 2008. Under its primary mandate to serve as “lender of last resort” in a banking panic, the Fed led a desperate effort to fund and implement the response it had quietly organized in the course of the year before to halt the stampede that began after Lehman Brothers failed – a firebreak, not a “bailout.”

Had the panic continued, a second Great Depression  might have taken hold, perhaps even more stubborn and costly to resolve than the first. There should be no doubt about what happened in 2008, yet to this point there is mainly confusion. The best book may still be Last Resort: The Financial Crisis and the Future of Bailouts (Chicago, 2018), by Eric Posner, but it is not good enough. Understanding in some detail the Fed’s response to the panic is important for what it says about the prospects for responding effectively to climate change. (In the same way, much can be learned from the rapid success of the multinational campaign to develop a COVID vaccine.)

“NATO enlargement” and  “The Panic of 2008,” are on their way to becoming tropes, catch phrases,  figures of  speech, that evoke complicated historic developments, much as “The Titanic,” “The Guns of August,” “Pearl  Harbor,” “Dunkirk” and “D-Day” do today. The process of distillation takes time and much exploration by countless interpreters.  This is a weekly column; I try to keep it under a thousand words, eight paragraphs or so.  But I return to these topics, and a few others, again and again, adding new material and elaborating.


The mistakes involved in “NATO enlargement” have yet to be acknowledged; central bankers’ resourceful response to “The Panic of 2008” is still poorly understood.  To learn more, I can only suggest for now that you keep reading.

David Warsh, a veteran columnist and an economic historian, is proprietor of Somerville-based economicprincipals.com, where this column originated.